World · Nonproliferation
Trump Approves a Saudi Nuclear Deal That Could Open the Door to Uranium Enrichment
The agreement, expected to be announced within days, would give Riyadh something Washington long refused to share, and it lands while the United States is at war with Iran.
US President Donald Trump has approved a nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia that could eventually allow the kingdom to enrich uranium on its own soil, a step Riyadh has sought for years and nonproliferation advocates have long resisted, according to people familiar with the decision. The move, first reported by The Wall Street Journal and confirmed by The Associated Press through two sources, is expected to be announced publicly as early as Wednesday.
The agreement is expected to run for 30 years and to bring American companies into the build-out of Saudi Arabia’s civilian nuclear program. It could clear the way for a uranium enrichment facility in the kingdom following a joint US-Saudi study, and it is expected to be submitted to Congress for review, where it may meet resistance from lawmakers who fear opening a new front in nuclear proliferation.
Why enrichment is the sticking point
Enrichment sits at the heart of the concern. The same process that produces fuel for power plants can, taken much further, move a country toward the material for a weapon, which is why Washington has historically tried to keep it out of such deals. The United Arab Emirates built its Barakah plant under a US “123 agreement” that barred domestic enrichment, a restraint nonproliferation experts call the “gold standard.” Reporting on the Saudi accord indicates it would not carry those same safeguards, and that departure is what has alarmed critics most.
The timing sharpens every one of those worries. The approval comes while the United States is fighting an active war with Iran, and as Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman weighs the kingdom’s security in a volatile Gulf. The crown prince has said before that Saudi Arabia would seek a nuclear weapon if Iran obtained one. Senator Ed Markey, among the deal’s sharpest critics as it took shape, warned that granting Riyadh enrichment capability now could inflame the very conflict Washington is already fighting.
Could potentially explode the conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Sen. Ed Markey
Why enrichment is the sticky point
- Enrichment is dual-use: it makes reactor fuel, but taken far enough it can produce weapons material.
- The US-UAE “123 agreement” barred domestic enrichment, the so-called gold standard.
- Reporting indicates the Saudi deal would not include those same safeguards.
- The agreement is expected to go to Congress, which can scrutinise it or try to block it.
A long push, a changed region
The effort itself is not new. Both Trump, in his first term, and former President Joe Biden sought a civil-nuclear pact with Riyadh, part of the crown prince’s Vision 2030 plan to wean the economy off oil. What has shifted is the regional picture. A mutual defence pact signed last year between Saudi Arabia and nuclear-armed Pakistan has fuelled speculation about where the kingdom might ultimately look for security guarantees, with Pakistani officials suggesting their arsenal could be made available to the Saudis if the need arose.
Supporters of the deal frame it as hard-headed statecraft: binding a pivotal Gulf power closer to Washington, countering Iran and winning billions in business for American firms in a market where Russia and China are eager sellers. Critics counter that it risks igniting a regional arms race and undercuts the very rules the United States has spent decades urging others to obey. Either way, the argument now moves to Congress.
Why a nuclear-weapon-free region should care
For St. Vincent and the Grenadines, this is a story about rules, not reactors. The Caribbean and Latin America form the world’s first populated nuclear-weapon-free zone, established under the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco, and SVG, like its neighbours, has built its security around the global nonproliferation regime rather than around arms. Small states have no deterrent of their own. What they have is a set of treaties and norms meant to apply to everyone.
When a superpower appears ready to relax the gold standard for a favoured partner, it chips at those norms and at the confidence smaller nations place in them. A Gulf arms race would also travel outward, through the price of oil and the stability of a global economy that import-dependent islands cannot opt out of. The reactors would be built far away, but the precedent would not stay there.
This report is based on anonymous sources and reporting about a decision that has not been formally announced. Terms could change before or after any announcement, and details reflect reporting available at publication.